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Corporate Financing Frictions and Employee Mental Health 
 
Abstract 
This paper argues that corporate financing frictions can have an adverse effect on 
employee mental health, an important determinant of employee productivity. To 
identify the causal effects of financing frictions, we exploit variation in firms’ need 
to refinance their long-term debt in 2008, a period when refinancing became more 
difficult due to the credit crunch. Using administrative microdata, we find that 
antidepressant use grows significantly more among employees of firms in higher 
need of debt refinancing. Most of this effect occurs at employees keeping their jobs, 
pointing to decreased perceptions of job security as a possible transmission channel. 
 
1. Introduction 
A growing literature documents that financial constraints amplify the adverse effects of 
economic shocks on firms’ human capital. Giroud and Mueller (2017) provide evidence that high-
leverage firms decreased their employment more during the Great Recession in response to local 
demand shocks. The authors argue that leverage may impair firms’ ability to retain temporarily 
unnecessarily employees (labor hoarding), a practice that firms may otherwise find optimal in 
order to preserve human capital and avoid hiring/rehiring costs. Caggese, Cuñat and Metzger (2019) 
find that financial constraints prompt firms experiencing economic distress to implement sub-
optimal dismissal policies, firing short-tenured workers with high future expected productivity. 
Baghai, Silva, Thell, and Vig (2016) document that firms lose workers with the highest cognitive 
and noncognitive skills due to financial distress as they approach bankruptcy, whereas Brown and 
Matsa (2016) show that financial distress can discourage talented job applicants. 
In this paper, we document a novel cost of financial constraints on firms’ human capital: 
we provide evidence that financial constraints can exacerbate the adverse effects of economic 
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shocks on employee mental health. Employees’ mental well-being should be a primary concern 
for any firm, given its role in employee productivity, absenteeism and employee turnover 
(Bubonya et al., 2017; Burton et al., 2008; Duijts et al., 2007). We argue that financial constraints 
contribute to a greater probability of job loss, and that decreased job security may trigger mental 
health problems also for employees who manage to keep their jobs.  
 To study the effects of financial constraints on employee mental health, we must overcome 
two empirical challenges. First, we need to establish a quantitative measure of mental health.  
To do so, we exploit rich administrative data from the Netherlands, in particular a population-wide 
medicine use register, which records annual binary indicators of medicine use grouped by 4-digit 
ATC (Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical) codes. As a measure of mental health, we focus on the 
use of antidepressants (ATC: N06A), drugs that are predominantly prescribed to treat serious 
mental illnesses, such as depressive disorders, anxiety disorders or bipolar disorders (Gardarsdottir 
et al., 2007; Simon et al., 2014). Although antidepressant use does not cover the complete spectrum 
of mental health problems, especially milder conditions, general practitioners in the Netherlands 
frequently employ antidepressants as the first line of treatment for mental health complaints.1 
Furthermore, as the medically unjustified use of antidepressants is reported to be low (Piek et al., 
2011), patients prescribed these medicines indeed suffer from mental problems. 
The second empirical challenge is how to disentangle the effects of financial constraints 
from the effects of economic distress that make these constraints bind. As the papers cited in the 
introductory paragraph also highlight, the adverse effects of financial constraints on human capital 
are the most pronounced in bad economic times. Yet, during economic distress, variables that 
could serve to measure a firm’s financial health (such as profitability or firm leverage) are also 
                                                 
1 In 2010, 30% of patients with any psychological diagnoses were prescribed antidepressants (Nuijen et al., 2012). 
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likely correlated with the firm’s sensitivity to the economic shock, the firm’s labor demand, and 
ultimately the mental health of its employees. 
Therefore, instead of focusing on contemporaneous measures of financial health, we 
identify a balance sheet vulnerability that made firms more likely to be financially constrained 
during a subsequent economic shock. In particular, we exploit the unforeseen credit supply shock 
presented by the Global Financial Crisis and employ an empirical strategy motivated by Almeida, 
Campello, Laranjeira and Weisbenner (2011)2. We consider the long-term debt maturity structure 
of 352 large Dutch companies that employed over 330,000 people on the 1st of January 2008, and 
identify firms as financially constrained if they had to refinance a large part (minimally 25% in 
our baseline model) of their long-term debt outstanding in 2008 (we call these firms the high-
repayment or treated firms).  
The underlying idea of this identification strategy is that firms that had to repay a larger 
share of their outstanding long-term debt in 2008 faced refinancing difficulties due to the credit 
crunch. We offer two pieces of evidence in support. First, bank lending is the main source of 
external financing for Dutch firms (Kalara and Zhang, 2018), and the Netherlands experienced a 
strong negative bank credit supply shock in 2007-2008 (Duchi and Elbourne, 2016). As Figure 1 
reveals, almost all Dutch banks tightened their lending standards (for large firms) in each quarter 
staring from end-2007, which contributed to the slowdown of business lending observed from mid-
2008 (DNB, 2009; van der Veer and Hoeberichts, 2016). In the last quarter of 2008, the net 
borrowing of Dutch firms turned significantly negative for the first time in many years (Figure 2). 
Second, there is direct survey evidence indicating that firms experienced a negative credit supply 
                                                 




shock: in 2009Q1 21% of the Dutch companies reported the unavailability of bank lending as the 
most important crisis-related problem they faced (56% among those firms that reported any 
problems).3  
[Insert Figures 1 and 2] 
As the maturity profile of long-term debt is the cumulative outcome of hard-to-reverse 
decisions made several years prior to 2008, it is unlikely that the 2008 repayment share is 
correlated with the sensitivity of the firm to the economic downturn or other unobservable factors. 
This is particularly true because in our regression models we control for time-invariant employee 
unobservables (employee fixed effects) and we allow for different flexible time trends for firms 
with distinct pre-crisis characteristics (controls * year fixed effects). The included control variables 
(industry, firm size, cash ratio, long-term debt to assets and cash flow) aim to pick up any 
systematic differences in firms’ long-term debt maturity structure that might have also affected the 
firm’s economic perspectives and personnel policies, and thus its employees’ mental health, during 
the crisis.  
The results from the regression models suggest a significant and persistent effect of the 
credit supply shock on employee mental health. People employed on 1 January 2008 by firms with 
at least 25% of their long-term debt maturing in 2008 faced a 0.44 pp (percentage points) higher 
average probability of antidepressant use in the 2008-2012 period, which is an economically 
significant 9% increase with respect to the 5% unconditional prevalence. The 9% increase in the 
                                                 
3  COEN Business Survey Netherlands 2009Q1, administered by Statistics Netherlands. The sample consists of 
establishments with more than 5 employees; the average sample size of the COEN surveys is approximately 6,000 
establishments. The crisis-related questions were first added in 2009Q1. The question of interest asks about the most 
important effect of the economic downturn that the respondent experiences (problems acquiring credit, problems 
attracting equity, losses on deposits, value loss of investments, increased debtor risk or problems saving surplus funds), 
62% mentions that none of these effects are important (i.e. no important effects or important effects are unlisted). 21% 




probability of antidepressant use is comparable in magnitude to the 7.5% rise in antidepressant 
prescription volume due to a 20% decline in US housing prices between July 2006 and February 
2009 as estimated by Lin, Ketcham, Rosenquist and Simon (2013). 
These results are qualitatively robust to variations in control variables, restricting or 
broadening the sample of firms, and to altering the 25% refinancing cut-off. We also perform a 
placebo test to verify that our results are not driven by the excess sensitivity of treated firms to the 
economic downturn in 2008-2009 (i.e., macroeconomic effects unrelated to the credit supply 
shock). Furthermore, the results on deteriorating mental health extend beyond the use of 
antidepressants. Using survey data, we show that the probability of having a high degree of mental 
health problems in 2012 (measured on the Kessler psychological distress scale) is 2.5 pp higher 
for employees of treated firms (+71% relative to the 3.5% baseline), while the probability of having 
a moderate or high degree of mental health problems is 5.1 pp higher (+15% relative to the 33% 
baseline).4  
The estimated 0.44 pp increase in antidepressant use is a weighted average treatment effect 
on employees who left their job during the sample period (leavers) and on those who stayed in 
their jobs (stayers). Based on the literature, we argue that a main transmission channel from 
refinancing difficulties to employee mental health is job loss for leavers and decreased job security 
for stayers. Financial constraints may negatively affect firms’ labor demand (Benmelech et al., 
2011; Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Giroud and Mueller, 2017; Huber, 2018; Popov and Rocholl, 2018), 
and the ensuing job loss can have an adverse effect on employees’ mental health (Browning and 
                                                 
4 Keeping in mind the differences in the estimated models (due to the cross-sectional nature of the survey data), the 
higher treatment effects on these survey-based measures of mental health may suggest that the effect on antidepressant 
use is a lower bound for the impact of refinancing difficulties on employee mental health. Our results could be also 
considered as a lower bound because we do not observe the intensive margin of antidepressant use (e.g. defined daily 




Heinesen, 2012; Ganster and Rosen, 2013; Schaller and Stevens, 2015). However, decreased job 
security can damage employee mental health even in the absence of actual job loss (Burgard et al., 
2009; Kim and Von Dem Knesebeck, 2015; Reichert and Tauchmann, 2011; Witte, 1999). Green 
(2011) concludes that for an employee of average employability the mental health effect of extreme 
job insecurity is similar to the effect of unemployment. 
 We indeed find that employees of high-repayment firms had a 6.2 pp higher probability of 
job separation during the 2008-2010 period. Although we cannot perfectly distinguish true 
dismissals from voluntary departures – part of which may pre-empt dismissal –, we observe a 
channel of dismissal that accounts for approximately half of all redundancies for economic reasons 
in the Netherlands, dismissal with a permit from the Dutch Employee Insurance Agency (EIA, or 
UWV in Dutch). Employees of treated firms had a substantially higher probability of dismissal via 
this channel. 
Can the greater propensity of job loss in treated firms completely explain the increase in 
antidepressant use? We argue that this is not the case, and that stayers also suffered from 
deteriorating mental health. First, in a back-of-the-envelope calculation, we multiply the job loss 
estimates (with an upper bound of 6.2 pp) with the effects of job loss on depression/anxiety 
reported by Schaller and Stevens (2015) (1.6 pp). From this calculation it is clear that the 0.44 pp 
overall increase in antidepressant use is too big to be explained by greater job loss alone. Second, 
we restrict our sample to employees who kept their jobs at least till the end of the year in which 
we measure antidepressant use. In this sub-sample, we still find that the probability of 
antidepressant use in treated firms was 0.3 pp higher in the 2008-2012 period.5  
                                                 
5 The group of employees who keep their job is a selected sample and selection is possibly endogenous to changes in 
mental health outcomes. For example, employees who stayed with financially constrained firms might be in general 
more resilient to job insecurity. These employees might have reacted more mildly to increasing job insecurity due to 
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Finally, we study treatment heterogeneity among stayers to test whether job insecurity is 
indeed a driver for greater antidepressant use for these employees. Based on the economics and 
psychology literatures we identify five personal/household characteristics that are expected to 
increase the mental health burden of job insecurity, older age, being male, having no partner, 
having children in the household, and having a salary that constitutes a large share of total 
household income. When we interact our treatment indicator with these moderator characteristics, 
we find statistically significantly larger treatment effects for employees without a partner, those 
with children in their household, and for employees whose salary constitutes a large share of their 
total household income. Treatment effects appear to be larger for employees who are at least 45 
years old, but the difference is not statistically significant at any conventional level, whereas male 
and female employees appear to be similarly affected. Taken together, these results provide 
support to our hypothesis that greater job insecurity is driving increased antidepressant use among 
employees who do not lose their jobs.  
This article relates to three strands of literature in finance and economics. First of all, as 
cited in the introductory paragraph, a growing literature in finance studies the effects of financial 
constraints on firms’ human capital. We combine firm-level financial data with rich employee-
level data on antidepressant use to document a novel cost of financial constraints,  
their detrimental effect on employee mental health. We show that the mental health toll of financial 
constraints is not restricted to dismissed employees but it is also substantial for employees who 
stay with the firm. As argued above, the mental health of employees, particularly of those not 
                                                 
the economic downturn even in the absence of financial constraints, introducing a downward bias in our estimates of 
the financial constraints’ effects on these employees’ mental health. As we lack any good instruments for job 
separation, we cannot claim a causal interpretation for our results on the sub-sample of employees who keep their job. 
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dismissed, should be a prime concern of firms due to mental illnesses’ burden on employee 
productivity. 
Another strand of literature related to our work studies the health effects of financial and 
economic crises. Several papers in this field report a negative correlation between unemployment 
rates and mental health status (e.g. Bradford and Lastrapes, 2009; Charles and DeCicca, 2008; 
Tefft, 2011). We also study how employment relations contributed to the mental health of 
employees during a crisis period, but contrary to the previous literature, we use employer-
employee matched data to disentangle the mental health effects of the financial crisis (credit supply 
shock) from the effects of the ensuing economic crisis (the Great Recession). Furthermore, we 
show that crisis periods may have an adverse mental health effect even on employees who manage 
to keep their jobs but who may suffer from decreased perceptions of job security. 
Finally, this paper also relates to the literature on the health effects of job displacement. 
Findings of this literature generally indicate a negative causal relation between job loss and mental 
health (Browning and Heinesen, 2012; Schaller and Stevens, 2015), although not unequivocally 
(Salm, 2009). The key difference between these papers and our work is that while the job 
displacement literature’s main interest is the effect of job loss per se, we focus on the effects of a 
firm-level financial shock that may be propagated by job loss, among other channels. We argue 
that it is not possible to infer the mental health effects of the financial constraints that we study 
directly from the job displacement literature, most importantly because the majority of employees 
in financially constrained firms do not lose their jobs, yet they may suffer from workplace stress 
and increased job insecurity.  
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the 
institutional setting, and presents our empirical strategy. Section 3 documents the baseline results, 
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financial constraints’ effects on employees’ antidepressant use. Section 4 studies a transmission 
channel, increased job insecurity, and presents evidence that the increase in antidepressant use is 
not restricted to employees losing their jobs. Section 5 presents robustness and placebo tests. 
Section 6 concludes. 
2. Data, institutional setting, and empirical specification 
We use administrative data from the Netherlands for the 2006–2016 period. Our dataset 
combines medicine use and employment data at the individual level with financial data at the 
corporate (employer) level. All administrative data are provided by Statistics Netherlands (SN), 
and separate databases are linked using unique (pseudonymized) identifiers at the individual or 
firm level. Appendix A provides details on the databases used (Table A.1.) and on variable 
definitions (Table A.2.). 
2.1 Firm-level financial data 
Under the data framework of Statistics Netherlands, the definition of a firm is hierarchical, 
whereby the enterprise group stands on top of the hierarchy and is considered the center of 
financial decision making. All corporate financial data are provided at the (consolidated) enterprise 
group level. An enterprise group consists of one or more business units, which are characterized 
by independent production decisions and the ability to offer their products to external parties, and 
comprise one or more legal entities (e.g., BVs - private limited liability companies) over which the 
enterprise group has majority control. An enterprise group in our sample consists of on average 
5.5 business units, although 115 of the 352 enterprise groups only have a single business unit. 
Hereafter we use firm and enterprise group interchangeably. 
Firm-level financial data is from the Annual Statistics of Finances of Large Enterprises 
(SFLE, in Dutch: Statistiek Financiën van Grote Ondernemingen, SGFO), which contains 
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information on the consolidated balance sheets and income statements of the largest Dutch 
enterprise groups. In 2007, all enterprise groups with at least EUR 23m in total assets were 
surveyed, amounting to a sample of 1204 firms. The scope of consolidation is the Netherlands; 
foreign subsidiaries of Dutch internationals and Dutch subsidiaries of foreign internationals are 
not consolidated. Financial data is presented by calendar year; only for a small share of companies 
does the financial year not coincide with the calendar year.6  
In most of our regression specifications, we add (industry * year) fixed effects. We use the 
first two digits of the 1993 version of the Dutch industry classification codes (SBI), which aligns 
with the European NACE Rev.1 classification at the 4-digit level.7  
2.2 Employee-level labor data 
Information on employer-employee links is provided to SN by the Employee Insurance 
Agency (EIA or, in Dutch, UWV), an administrative authority responsible for implementing 
employee insurances and recording labor market data. From these data, SN creates the databases 
BAANKENMERKENBUS, which records qualitative job characteristics (e.g., the type of the job 
such as regular employment or internship, and the start and end dates of an employment relation), 
and BAANSOMMENTAB, which records quantitative job characteristics (such as salaries). We use 
the information in these databases to link employees to firms, to construct our sample (e.g., 
                                                 
6 We do not observe firms’ financial years, but as per BvD Orbis data only 9% of the 900 firms in the Netherlands 
that meet our broadest sample selection criteria (Dutch-owned with at least EUR 23 million in assets) had their 2010 
financial year ending not on the 31st of December. The financial year is labelled as the calendar year with which it has 
the most overlap (e.g. data of a financial year ending on 30 September 2019 are labelled as 2019 data).  
7 We use the codes provided in the General Business Register (in Dutch: Algemeen Bedrijven Register or ABR). The 
industry classification codes are registered at the Chamber of Commerce for each legal unit. In the General Business 
Register, SN provides a code at the business unit level by using the code of the legal unit within the business unit that 
has the most employees. Similar to this approach, we use the code of the business unit with the most employees within 
an enterprise group as the enterprise group-level code. 
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excluding interns), and to determine when employees separated from their initial job (using the 
unique employment relationship identifier – baanid). 
In order to study involuntary job separation, we also collect information on job losses with 
a dismissal permit granted to an employer by the Employee Insurance Agency (UWV). The 
UWVONTSLAGTAB database contains the list of such job separations, as well as information on 
the reason of dismissal (economic, dysfunctional/culpable employee behavior, long-term illness, 
or frequent absenteeism). We only study dismissals for economic reasons. 
2.3 Individual-level antidepressant use data 
The Netherlands has a universal health care insurance system where taking out the basic 
health insurance is mandatory for all residents. Care consumers are free to choose among multiple 
nation-wide private health insurers who offer the same regulated basic insurance package for an 
annual premium of approximately 1000-1200 EUR (subsidies are available for low-income 
households). The package covers general practitioner (GP) care, maternity care, hospital care, 
home nursing care, pharmaceutical care, and mental healthcare, but does not cover for example 
dentistry or physical therapy which may be covered by supplementary insurance products. Care 
consumers must pay for their health consumption up to an annual deductible (EUR 150 in 2008 
and EUR 385 as of 2016; the deductible can be voluntarily increased to lower the insurance 
premium). Certain care products such as GP care and maternity care do not count towards the 
deductible. 
The initial point of contact for most medical complaints is the general practitioner. All 
residents are registered with a local GP of their choice. GPs play a gatekeeper role; their referral 
is necessary for (non-urgent) hospital and specialist care. This holds for mental health problems as 
well; patients first approach their GP (or in rare cases a so-called first-line psychologist), who may 
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refer them to the second-line specialist mental care in case of any serious problem. GPs frequently 
employ antidepressant medication as the first line of treatment for mental health complaints; in 
2010, 30% of adult patients with any psychological diagnoses were prescribed antidepressants 
(Nuijen et al., 2012). Unjustified antidepressant use is reported to be low (Piek et al., 2011). 
The individual-level medicine use database (MEDICIJNTAB) comprises annual binary 
indicators for the use of medicines that are reimbursed under the Dutch basic health insurance 
scheme. The indicators are grouped at the 4-digit ATC (Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical) level. 
Therefore, we observe if a person was reimbursed (any positive amount of) antidepressants (ATC-
code N06A) in a particular year, but we do not observe the exact chemical substance (e.g., 
paroxetine, N06AB05) nor do we observe the exact amounts (e.g., defined daily doses, DDDs). 
As antidepressants are only available on prescription, and all antidepressants are reimbursed under 
the basic health insurance8, the database gives a complete picture of antidepressant use. 
As a secondary measure of mental health, we make use of a composite index “degree of 
experiencing psychological complaints” from the 2012 Health Monitor9, a national cross-sectional 
survey on the physical and mental health of people aged 19 and above. This composite index is 
based on the ten questions of the Kessler Psychological Distress Scale (K10) (Kessler et al., 2003), 
such as [in the past four weeks] “How often did you feel sad or depressed?” and “How often did 
you feel nervous?” (see Appendix A for the full list of questions). For each question, respondents 
                                                 
8 Reimbursements for medicines count towards the compulsory annual deductible. Some medicines are only partially 
reimbursed and a personal contribution must be paid. We could also have studied the use of anxiolytic drugs (N05B, 
such as benzodiazepines including alprazolam/Xanax); however, starting from 2009 these drugs are only reimbursed 
in rare cases and are consequently missing from the MEDICIJNTAB database. Furthermore, due to the side-effects of 
benzodiazepines, Dutch guidelines on pharmacological treatment of anxiety disorders recommend the use of 
antidepressants (Sonnenberg et al., 2012). 
9  “Gezondheidsmonitor Volwassenen en Ouderen 2012”, a collaboration of the Public Health Services (GGD), 
Statistics Netherlands, and the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM). While the 
MEDICIJNTAB database covers the whole Dutch population, we can match approximately 7600 employees in our 
sample to the 2012 Health Monitor. 
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can choose between the options 5 ‘Always', 4 'Usually', 3 'Sometimes', 2 'Occasionally' and 1 
'Never’. The scores for the ten questions are summed leading to a total score between 10 and 50. 
The Health Monitor classifies the degree of mental health problems that people suffer from as 
“none or low” with a total score under 16, as “moderate” with a score between 16 and 29, and as 
“high” with a score over 29. 
2.4 Other databases 
We use two additional databases provided by SN in the selection of our employee sample. 
First, we determine employees’ age and gender using the Municipal Personal Records Database 
(or in Dutch: Gemeentelijke Basis Administratie or GBA). Second, we collect information on the 
position of each person in their household from the Income of People (in Dutch; Integraal 
Persoonlijk Inkomen or IPI) database.  
In order to illustrate the strong (cross-sectional) correlation between worrying about job 
loss and antidepressant use, we also use answers to the question “Are you concerned of keeping 
your job?” from the National Labor Conditions Survey (in Dutch: Nationale Enquête 
Arbeidsomstandigheden, NEA), an annual survey on working conditions, accidents at work, work 
content, and industrial relations. 
2.5 Attrition 
The administrative databases on medicine use and employment do not suffer from the 
attrition problems that surveys usually face (e.g., non-response). Yet, attrition might occur if 
someone leaves the Dutch population, for instance due to emigration or death. Using the Wealth 
of Households (VEHTAB) dataset, which lists all households and household members that belong 
to the Dutch population on the 1st of January of each year, we find that attrition is similar for treated 
14 
 
and control employees. 10  Attrition affects the definition of our main outcome variable 
(antidepressant use): we assign a missing value to person-year observations where the given person 
was missing from VEHTAB (we do this because MEDICIJNTAB does not cover the antidepressant 
use of people who are not part of the Dutch population).  
2.6 Sample composition 
The starting point of our sample selection is the 1204 firms (enterprise groups) in the 2007 
annual SFLE (Statistics of Finances of Large Enterprises). Because repayment obligations of local 
subsidiaries may have limited financial consequences as corporate groups can meet these 
obligations through their internal capital markets (e.g. Desai et al., 2004), we exclude Dutch 
subsidiaries of foreign internationals. We identify these subsidiaries as firms with more than 50% 
of the share capital owned by foreign-based companies or with an Ultimate Controlling 
Institutional Unit (UCI) located outside the Netherlands. 
Following Almeida et al. (2011), we also exclude firms with a low long-term debt 
(excluding the current portion of long-term debt) to total assets ratio at the year-end of 2007. This 
is because our treatment classification aims to contrast firms with comparable debt profiles, for 
which long-term debt financing is a permanently important source of funds. In the baseline 
specification, we only consider firms with at least 10% of long-term debt to total assets. In 
robustness tests, we will vary this cut-off. 
Finally, we exclude firms that operate in government-controlled and heavily regulated 
industries. These are government management (SBI code 7511), public transport via railway 
(6010), national post with universal service obligation (6411), and utilities (40-41). We further 
                                                 
10 Untabulated; by 2016 treated employees are 0.16% more likely to be in the Dutch population (t-stat 0.74). 
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exclude outsourcing firms (74501, 74502) because we cannot observe the actual company where 
outsourced employees work. The resulting sample consists of 353 firms (enterprise groups). 
We identify the business units of these enterprise groups on 1 January 2008 using the 
General Business Register (ABR). Subsequently, for the same date, we identify the people 
employed by each business unit. We restrict our sample to employees with a regular or on-call job 
contract11 aged between 20 and 60 years in 200812, and who are the household head of their 
household or the partner of the household head13. The final sample consists of 328,229 employees. 
The steps of sample composition are presented in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1] 
2.7 Treatment classification and summary statistics 
We classify firms as “treated” or “control” based on the share of long-term debt that they 
were required to repay in 2008. Unlike most databases comprising European firms’ financial data 
(e.g., Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis), which report the current portion of long-term debt aggregated with 
all other current liabilities, the SFLE database reports these items separately. This is important 
because other current liabilities, such as short-term bank loans, may be correlated with the business 
                                                 
11 On-call employees only work when the employer calls them up, as they do not have fixed working hours. We 
exclude employees classified as interns and outsourced workers. We also exclude director-major shareholders, who 
are people with a considerable ownership in the firm they manage.  
12 In the sample period, early retirement was widespread in the Netherlands with 80% of employees retiring before 
reaching the state pension age of 65, mostly at the age of 60. As labor market shocks have arguably limited impact on 
employees close to retirement, we exclude them. 
13 SN classifies people as either household head (person with the highest socio-economic position), partner (married 
or unmarried) of the household head, children of the household head, or other/unknown (e.g. children of the partner 
from a previous marriage). We only include people of the first two categories, excluding children and other/unknown 
household members because we aim to limit our sample to people for whom an employment shock (or a threat thereof) 
has high stakes. 
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outlook that the company faced preceding the crisis, and may thus fail to be exogenous to the 
outcomes we study.  We calculate our “forcing” variable as:   
𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 =  
𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐
𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 +  𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐
 
In our baseline specification, we classify firms as treated if the “Share of current portion 
of LT debt” ratio is at least 25%. This results in 23 treated and 329 control firms. In robustness 
tests we will vary this cut-off point.  
The SFLE database differentiates between five categories of long-term debt, (1) Debt to 
group companies, (2) Subordinated loans, (3) Bonds outstanding, (4) Loans from domestic 
financial institutions and (5) Other long-term debt (a residual category that includes, inter alia, 
loans from private individuals, derivatives, and lease obligations). Ideally, we would only consider 
bonds outstanding and bank loans (and the current portion thereof) because these financing forms 
are the hardest to renegotiate, but the SFLE reports the current portion of all five debt categories 
combined. Therefore, we calculate “Total LT debt” in the formula above as the sum of all five 
categories.14  
Table 2 presents summary statistics for treated and control firms (panel A) and for their 
employees included in our sample (panel B). The last three columns show a comparison between 
treated and control; the column “Raw Δ” presents the difference in means, the column  
“Adjusted Δ” presents the difference in means adjusted in a regression setting for industry fixed 
effects (and in Panel B also for the firm financial controls that we include in our baseline 
                                                 
14 As Table 2 shows, the scope of this problem is limited because bank loans constitute by far the largest share of long-
term debt for most companies in our sample. We also execute a robustness test where we exclude firms with any long-




regressions: log total assets, liquid assets to total assets, long-term debt to total assets, and cash 
flow), and the last column presents the significance of the regression coefficient “Adjusted Δ” by 
means of a t-statistic. 
[Insert Table 2] 
As Panel A shows, treated firms (at the end of 2007) were smaller in terms of total assets 
but larger in terms of number of employees (column Raw Δ). Treated firms had a lower cash ratio 
(liquid assets to total assets) and more long-term debt outstanding relative to their total assets, but 
they exhibited a more positive cash flow in 2007. As the “Adjusted Δ” and “t-stat” columns reveal, 
once controlling for industry composition, only this latter difference (and the difference in our 
forcing variable, share of current portion) is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
 There are minor differences between treated and control firms in the structure of long-term 
debt as well. For both groups, the most important source of long-term debt is bank lending; 
however, control firms rely slightly more on subordinated lending, lending from group companies, 
and other long-term debt, and consequently less on bank lending. Bonds constitute an insignificant 
share of debt financing for most firms. 
Turning to employee characteristics, antidepressant use, our main outcome variable, is an 
annual binary indicator that takes the value 1 if a person was reimbursed for antidepressant 
medications in the given year (we multiply the indicator by 100 hence our results are in %). 4.1% 
of our sample used antidepressants in 2007, comprising 4.75% of treated employees and 3.99% of 
control employees. This difference practically disappears in the regression setting in column 
“Adjusted Δ”. While a similar pre-treatment level of the dependent variable is not required for 
identification in a difference-in-differences setting, it is reassuring that the included control 
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variables adequately explain any differences in treated and control employees’ antidepressant use 
in 2007. 
Although the probability of antidepressant use in 2007 is similar between treated and 
control employees (after adding the firm-level controls), Panel B shows that a few other employee 
characteristics exhibit some differences. Treated employees earn less, have slightly longer tenure, 
are younger and more likely female. These differences are diminished once we control for industry 
fixed effects and the financial control variables included in our main specification. Moreover, in a 
robustness test we will also control for year effects interacted with these employee characteristics 
to account for any time trends that might depend on these characteristics (e.g., older employees 
might be more affected by the crisis). 
While Table 2 presents the pre-treatment characteristics of treated and control employees, 
Table 3 shows summary statistics for the outcome variables used later in the regressions of Tables 
4 and 6. Our main outcome variable, antidepressant use, has a mean of 5% in the 2006-2016 period, 
in other words on average 5 out of 100 employees used antidepressants in this period. Cumulative 
job separation is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the initial (1 January 2008) job 
ended by the end of the given year. By end-2010, approximately 30% of the 330 thousand initial 
jobs in our sample had terminated. This figure includes both voluntary and involuntary job 
separations (dismissals).15 The indicator variable Cumulative UWV dismissal takes the value 1 if 
the job ended with a dismissal permit for economic reasons from the Dutch Employee Insurance 
Agency (UWV) by the end of the given year. Approximately 0.8% of the initial jobs had ended 
with an UWV permit for economic reasons by end-2010. The large difference in total job 
                                                 
15 There is large variability in the persistence of employment relationships: in an unreported analysis we find that older 
and longer-tenured employees separate from their jobs with a lower probability. 
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separation and separation due to UWV dismissals may be explained by voluntary job separation 
(especially among younger and short-tenured workers), and by involuntary job separation other 
than with an UWV permit (as discussed in section 4.1, firms have multiple channels to dismiss 
employees, including with mutual consent).   
[Insert Table 3] 
2.8 Empirical specification 
Our difference-in-differences empirical specification compares the time-trend of 
antidepressant use of employees of high-repayment firms (treated) and other sample employees 
(controls), accounting for employee fixed effects, industry-specific year effects, and year effects 
that depend on pre-crisis firm (or employee) characteristics. We estimate a linear probability model: 
Antidepressant Use𝑖𝑖,𝑓𝑓,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = α𝑖𝑖 + 𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓βt + γj,t +  𝑥𝑥′𝑓𝑓,2007λ𝑡𝑡 + ϵi,f,j,t (1) 
where 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑓𝑓,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 is a binary indicator variable capturing whether individual i who 
worked on 1 January 2008 for firm f belonging to industry j was reimbursed for any antidepressant 
use in year t, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 are employee fixed effects, 𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓 is the treatment indicator that takes the value 1 for 
treated firms and 0 for control firms, 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 are (year * industry) fixed effects, and  𝑥𝑥𝑓𝑓,2007 is a 4-by-
1 column vector of firm f’s 2007 financial characteristics, comprising log total assets, liquid assets 
to total assets, long-term debt to total assets, and a measure of cash flow [=(net income plus 
depreciation and amortization) / total assets].16 These financial characteristics are derived from 
Almeida et al. (2011), who argue that industry fixed effects and these financial characteristics17 
                                                 
16 In a robustness test (column 4 of Table 4) we also include in 𝑥𝑥 a set of 2007 employee characteristics to account for 
the differences between treated and control employees reported in Panel B of Table 2. 
17 Almeida et al. (2011) further control for Tobin’s Q and credit ratings, variables unavailable in our dataset. 
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capture a lot of otherwise unobserved firm heterogeneity that is important both for the treatment 
classification (i.e., maturity structure of long-term debt) and firms’ business conditions prior to 
and during the crisis. 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡 are the differential year effects for the treated firms, our main coefficients 
of interest. Due to the presence of individual fixed effects we normalize 𝛽𝛽2007 = 0. We cluster 
standard errors at the firm (enterprise group) level because the treatment variation is at the firm 
level. 
The results from Model (1) will reveal that the treatment effects are most prominent in the 
2008-2012 period. To quantify the total treatment effect over this period, we also estimate the 
difference-in-differences model using a before and after period: 
Antidepressant Use𝑖𝑖,𝑓𝑓,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = α𝑖𝑖 + 𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐 β + γj,t +  𝑥𝑥′𝑓𝑓,2007λ𝑡𝑡 + ϵi,f,j,t (2) 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐 is an indicator for the post-treatment period (2008-2012); the included periods are 
2006 to 2012. 
In order to study treatment heterogeneity, we also use a version of Model (2) where we 
interact the treatment indicator with pre-treatment employee characteristics: 
Antidepressant Use𝑖𝑖,𝑓𝑓,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = α𝑖𝑖 +  𝑧𝑧′𝑖𝑖,2007 𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐 β + γj,t +  𝑥𝑥′𝑓𝑓,2007λ𝑡𝑡 + ϵi,f,j,t (3) 
where  𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,2007 is an n-by-1 column vector of 2007 employee characteristics such as age, gender 
or having a partner, and β is an n-by-1 column vector of coefficients. (The estimated models also 
include the interactions 𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐 δ1 and  𝑧𝑧′𝑖𝑖,2007 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐 δ2). 
We estimate Model (1) year-by-year, using OLS, after eliminating employee fixed effects 
by taking differences relative to the base year 2007. Similarly, for Model (2) we first take the 
difference between 2008-2012 average antidepressant use and 2006-2007 average antidepressant 
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use before estimation using OLS. When we estimate Models (1) and (2) for a sub-sample of 
employees who stay with the firm for at least the end of the year, we use the within estimator. 
Similarly, when we estimate Model (3) for staying employees, we also use the within estimator. 
3. The effect of financial constraints on employee mental health 
Figure 3 presents the estimated treatment effects (βt) from Model (1). Employees of the 
treated firms, relative to employees of the control firms, experience an increase in antidepressant 
use starting from 2008; the treatment effect reaches its peak in 2011 and it is not statistically 
significantly different from zero after 2014. 
[Insert Figure 3] 
 The relatively fast increase in antidepressant use in 2008 may reflect increased job 
insecurity (as discussed in Section 4), and is in line with the findings of Schaller and Stevens (2015) 
who document that displaced US workers exhibit depression or anxiety within months after the 
loss of their jobs. The immediacy of the treatment effect is further supported by results from the 
psychology literature. Kendler et al. (1999) study 15 different stressful life events and find that 11 
of them, including job loss, and financial or housing problems, are significantly associated with 
the onset of major depression in the month of occurrence. The onset of depression may have a 
swift effect on antidepressant use due to the prescription preferences of Dutch general practitioners: 
Van Marwijk, Bijl, Adèr, and De Haan (2001) report that in 1998 Dutch GPs prescribed 
antidepressants in 73% of the first consults for depressive symptoms. 
The persistence of the treatment effect can be partially explained by the persistence of 
depression. Depression (medical term: major depressive disorder) is a lifelong illness that is 
categorized by recurrent depressive episodes. The majority of patients recover (i.e., are no longer 
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symptomatic) within 12 months following a depressive episode; however, long-term recovery 
(lack of recurrence) is low, approximately 30% at a 6-year horizon, and almost 80% of patients 
experience at least one further episode in their lifetime. Furthermore, a large proportion (up to 27%) 
of patients never recover and develop chronic depressive illness (Malhi and Mann, 2018). The 
long-lasting nature of depression is also supported in our medicine use data, 57% of people in our 
sample who used antidepressants in 2006 continued to do so in 2012.  
We also estimate treatment effects for 2006, to investigate “parallel trends” before the 
treatment. Ideally, we would present trends for multiple pre-treatment periods, but the medicine 
use database is only available from 2006. As Figure 3 illustrates, treated and control employees 
demonstrated a similar change in antidepressant use between 2006 and 2007, conditional on the 
control variables. 
The data from Figure 3 coincide with those of Column (1) of Panel A, Table 4. For each 
specification in Table 4, Panel A presents the treatment effects over time (the coefficient estimates 
on the treated * year dummy interactions from Model 1), whereas Panel B shows the average 
treatment effects for 2008-2012 estimated by means of Model (2). All specifications control for 
employee fixed effects. The baseline specification in column (1) further controls for (industry * 
year) fixed effects and year fixed effects that depend linearly on 2007 firm financial characteristics. 
Columns (2) to (4) present variations on these additional controls. Column (2) drops the (2007 
firm financials * year) fixed effects, while column (3) defines industries at a coarser (sectoral) 
level instead of using 2-digit Dutch SBI93 industry codes. Finally, because the descriptive statistics 
in Table 2 show that treated and control employees exhibited pre-treatment differences in age, 
gender, salary, and tenure, column (4) includes the interaction of these characteristics with year 
dummies. All four specifications show qualitatively similar results, with 2008-2012 treatment 
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estimates ranging between 0.27 pp and 0.47 pp (a 5.4% - 9.4% effect relative to the 5% baseline 
probability of antidepressant use). 
[Insert Table 4] 
To better understand the magnitude of these treatment effects, we can compare them to 
estimates from the literature on the mental health effects of wealth and employment shocks. Our 
main result of a 5.4% to 9.4% relative increase in the probability of antidepressant use due to firm-
level (re)financing difficulties is similar to the effect of the 2006-2009 US housing price shock 
(7.51% rise in antidepressant prescription volume) reported by Ketcham, Rosenquist and Simon 
(2013), but smaller than the effect of job loss (22% increase in the probability of depression/anxiety) 
calculated by Schaller and Stevens (2015) or the effect of losing on average USD 220,000 during 
the October 2008 market crash (35% relative increase in the probability of antidepressant use) 
estimated by McInerney, Mellor and Nicholas (2013). This benchmarking exercise shows that 
firm-level (re)financing difficulties had a serious impact on employee mental health, although not 
directly comparable to the effects of job loss. 
While our main analysis is based on the direct measurement of (serious) mental problems 
that require the use of medication, we also examine the effects of the 2008 credit shock on a survey-
based mental health instrument. We use data from the 2012 Health Monitor 18 , a nationally 
representative survey on the physical and mental health of the Dutch adult population.  Due to the 
survey’s large sample size (390,000 people aged 19 or older), we are able to match 7604 
respondents within 323 of our sample firms. The survey offers a composite measure of the “Degree 
of mental health problems” on a 3-step scale of low/moderate/high that is based on the Kessler 
                                                 
18 The Health Monitor is conducted every four years starting in 2012. Consequently, no data is available prior to 2012. 
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psychological distress scale (see Section II or Appendix Table A.2 for details). Based on this 
measure we construct the dependent variables “High” and “At least moderate” (degree of mental 
health problems), with an unconditional sample mean of 3.5% and 33%, respectively.  
Table 5 presents the treatment effect estimates on the survey-based mental health indicators. 
In the regressions we control for the firm-level characteristics used in Table 4, including industry 
fixed effects. Due to the cross-sectional nature of the data, we cannot use individual fixed effects 
to account for time-invariant differences between treated and control employees. Because Table 2 
shows that treated employees are slightly younger and more likely female, characteristics that 
might have affected the economic crisis’ effects on mental health, we add employee age and gender 
as controls. We further control for 2007 antidepressant use to reduce the standard errors of our 
coefficient estimates. The results indicate that treated employees had a 2.5 pp (+71% compared to 
the baseline 3.5%) higher probability of having a high degree, and a 5.1 pp (+16% compared to 
the baseline 33%) higher probability of having an at least moderate degree of mental health 
problems in 2012.19 These results show that the evidence on the credit supply shock’s adverse 
effects on mental health extend beyond antidepressant use to other measures of mental health. 
[Insert Table 5] 
  
                                                 
19 Using the 2016 Health Monitor, the first available year since the 2012 start-up of this quadrennial survey, in 
untabulated regressions that replicate columns 1 and 2 of Table 5, we find no statistically significant treatment effects 
on “high” (+0.2 pp, t-value of 0.22) or “at least moderate” (+2.75 pp, t-value of 1.37) levels of mental problems in 
2016. This is in line with our main findings on antidepressant use, where we observed that treatment effects diminished 
and lost statistical significance after 2014. 
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4. The transmission channel of job insecurity 
4.1 Increased job insecurity of treated employees 
How can firm-level refinancing difficulties lead to an increase in employees’ 
antidepressant use? The estimated 0.44 pp increase in antidepressant use is a weighted average 
treatment effect on employees who left their job during the sample period (leavers) and on those 
who stayed in their jobs (stayers). We argue that an important transmission channel from 
refinancing difficulties to employee mental health is job loss for leavers and decreased job security 
for stayers. 
Previous work demonstrated that financial constraints can negatively affect firms’ labor 
demand. Chodorow-Reich (2014) finds evidence, among 2,000 non-financial US firms, that 
companies reduced employment more in the 2008-2009 period if they had pre-crisis relationships 
with banks that were in a less healthy condition during the financial crisis. Huber (2018) shows 
that German firms fully dependent on Commzerbank, a bank severely affected by the 2008 
financial crisis, reduced their employment on average by 5.3% between 2009 and 2012 compared 
to firms with no Commerzbank relationship. Giroud and Mueller (2017) report that employment 
in more highly levered US firms was more sensitive to declines in local consumer demand during 
the Great Recession. Giroud and Mueller argue that financing constraints may dampen labor 
demand by impairing firms’ ability to engage in labor hoarding, a practice of retaining temporarily 
unnecessary employees to preserve firm-specific human capital and to avoid firing/re-hiring costs. 
During the first crisis years, labor hoarding was widespread in the Netherlands; indeed, 
several studies credit to this phenomenon the relatively mild increase in Dutch unemployment rates 
between 2008 and 2010 (e.g. van den Berge et al., 2014). Nonetheless, as highlighted by Giroud 
and Mueller (2017), labor hoarding requires financial resources, which are scarcer for financially 
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constrained firms. In the Netherlands, financial resources are particularly important for labor 
hoarding due to the inflexible employment terms regarding both working hours and wages. Over 
80% of Dutch employees are covered by collective labor agreements (CLAs), which largely 
prevent companies from adjusting nominal wages downwards. Adjustments in the number of 
working hours are also not straightforward to implement because Dutch CLAs, unlike for instance 
German ones, do not contain provisions for temporary shorter working hours (Tijdens et al., 2014). 
Given these observations, we hypothesize that firms that had to repay a larger share of their 
long-term debt in 2008 had relatively fewer resources to engage in labor hoarding, and 
consequently employees of these firms suffered from decreased job security. The adverse mental 
health effects of job loss are well-documented (Browning and Heinesen, 2012; Ganster and Rosen, 
2013; Schaller and Stevens, 2015), which could explain treatment effects on leavers. However, 
decreased job security can damage employee mental health even in the absence of actual job loss 
(Burgard et al., 2009; Kim and Von Dem Knesebeck, 2015; Reichert and Tauchmann, 2011; Witte, 
1999).20 Green (2011), for instance, concludes that for an employee of average employability the 
mental health effect of extreme job insecurity is similar to the effect of unemployment. Therefore, 
decreased job security could also explain treatment effects on stayers. 
In line with this hypothesis, we find evidence that employees in treated firms were more 
likely to separate from their job during the crisis period. Column (1) of Table 6 presents the 
treatment effects on the (cumulative) probability of job separation. We assume that an employment 
relationship ended in a given year (“job separation”) if the job is not registered anymore in the 
                                                 
20 We also illustrate this negative association between job insecurity and mental health in the Netherlands, using the 
National Working Conditions Survey. Although we cannot establish causality, Table B.1 in Appendix B shows that 
employees answering “yes” to the question “Are you concerned of keeping your job?” are substantially (~2 pp or 44% 
relative to the 4.5% baseline) more likely to use antidepressants, even after controlling for a broad range of personal 
and firm characteristics. 
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“Quantitative characteristics of employment relationships” database (BAANSOMMENTAB) in the 
following year. We only consider the initial employment relationships that existed on 1 January 
2008. The results in column (1) show that treated employees had a 6.2 pp higher probability of job 
separation by the end of 2010, which is a substantial increase compared to the overall rate of job 
separation in our sample during the same period, 30% (as presented in Table 3). 
[Insert Table 6] 
 There are two caveats to the estimated treatment effects on job separation. First, it might 
be that treated firms in general have higher employee turnover, even after controlling for industry 
fixed effects and 2007 firm characteristics. We cannot study “parallel pre-trends” of job separation 
in this setup because, by definition, all employees are with their firm on the 1st of January 2008. 
To address this issue, we study the 2005-2007 job separation rate of 2005 employees of the treated 
and control firms. To do so, we match the 352 firms in our sample to their employees on 1 January 
2005.21 We then estimate three regressions for (cumulative) job separation up until end-2005, end-
2006, and end-2007 using the same controls as in column (1) of Table 6 (industry fixed effects and 
2007 financial characteristics). Table B.2 of Appendix B presents the results from this placebo 
test. If anything, the employees of treated firms in 2005 were less likely to be separated from their 
jobs than employees of control firms, although the estimates are economically and statistically 
close to zero. This leads us to conclude that in terms of employee turnover, treated firms were not 
different from control firms prior to the crisis. 
                                                 
21 We can match 325 of the 352 enterprise groups to their business units and employees on 1 January 2005. Out of the 
27 non-matched enterprise groups, 24 could not be matched because their identifier in the General Business Register 
changed between 2005 and 2008 due to restructuring, split, re-starting or mergers. Two enterprise groups were created 
in the period, and we find no information on one remaining enterprise group.  
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The second caveat is that our definition of job separation includes both voluntary and 
involuntary departures, which the data do not enable us to distinguish. Although a higher voluntary 
turnover rate may indicate increased occupational stress (Leontaridi and Ward-Warmedinger, 
2002), evidence of dismissals would arguably provide stronger support for the “job loss / fear of 
job loss” channel of the credit shock on mental health. Therefore, in column (2) of Table 6, we 
study the treatment effects on the cumulative probability of job contract termination by the 
employer for economic reasons and with a permit of the Employee Insurance Agency (UWV). In 
case of dismissal for economic reasons, and when the employer and the employee cannot reach a 
mutual agreement, the permit from the UWV provides a possibility for the firm to end the job 
relation. As the results indicate, treated employees had a 1.25 pp greater probability of being 
terminated with an UWV permit in the 2008-2010 period, which is an economically large increase 
compared to the 0.8% unconditional probability.22 
In summary, the results in Table 6 provide evidence that, during the first crisis years, job 
separation was greater in firms that had to repay a larger share of their long-term debt in 2008, and 
part of this increment in job separation was clearly involuntarily. 
4.2 Increased antidepressant use among employees who kept their jobs 
Can the greater propensity of job loss and its negative effects on employees who lost their 
jobs fully explain the deteriorating mental health of employees of firms with refinancing 
                                                 
22 Hoevenagel and Engelen (2013) estimate that termination with an UWV permit for economic reasons accounted for 
approximately 20% of all dismissals in the Netherlands in the 2011-2012 period. The majority of dismissals, around 
60%, happened with mutual consent, with ‘dysfunction’ (35% of all dismissals with mutual consent), ‘economic 
reasons’ (25%) and ‘disruption in the employment relationship / conflict’ (23%) cited as the most common reasons. 
Around 9% of dismissals took place via a sub-district court, mostly in case of dysfunction or a disruption in the 
employment relationship. Based on these figures, dismissals via a UWV permit capture around half of all dismissals 





difficulties? We argue that this is not the case, and that employees who managed to keep their jobs 
also suffered from an increased prevalence of mental health problems.  
First, in a back-of-the-envelope calculation, we multiply the job loss estimates (with an 
upper bound of 6.2 pp) in Table 6 with the effects of job loss on self-reported depression/anxiety 
estimated by Schaller and Stevens (2015) (1.6 pp). The resulting treatment effect (6.2 pp * 1.6 pp 
= 0.1 pp) is clearly smaller than the 0.44 pp overall increase in antidepressant use we estimate in 
Table 4. This suggests that it is not merely mental illness caused by job loss that is driving our 
results.  
Next, in Table 7 we restrict our sample to employees who kept their jobs at least till the 
end of the year in which we measure antidepressant use. In panel B of column 1, we find that the 
average probability of antidepressant use in the 2008-2012 period is still 0.303 pp higher in treated 
firms. This result is robust to the variations in control variables (columns 2 to 4) that we also apply 
in our main specification in Table 4. Although we cannot interpret these results causally due to the 
possibly endogenous nature of job separation, discussed in footnote 5, they support a negative 
effect of refinancing constraints on the mental health of employees who kept their jobs. 
[Insert Table 7] 
Finally, to test whether job insecurity is indeed a driver for antidepressant use among 
employees who kept their jobs, we study the moderating effect of personal/household 
characteristics that are expected to increase the mental health costs of job insecurity. We consider 
five characteristics based on the economics and psychology literatures, older age, being male, 
having no partner, having children in the household, and having a salary that constitutes a large 
share of total household income. Personal characteristics (age and gender) may influence re-
employability upon job loss. In the Netherlands, Deelen et al. (2018) show that following a 
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dismissal older (age 45-54 in their sample) men lose more in terms of employment probabilities 
than either prime-age men (age 35-44) or older women. The mental health effects of 
unemployment and job loss also appear to be stronger for men than for women (e.g., Kuhn et al., 
2009; Paul and Moser, 2009). This suggests that job insecurity may be more stressful for older and 
male employees. Having no partner may show the lack of a familial support system and could 
increase the risk of developing mental illness (Teo, Choi and Valenstein, 2013), whereas having a 
child could indicate that job loss is more consequential due to the higher number of dependents. 
Finally, having a salary that represents a greater share of the total household income (conditional 
on having a partner or not) may imply a more detrimental effect of an eventual job loss on the 
family budget. Indeed, Marcus (2013) suggests that the mental health effects of job loss are worse 
if the dismissed employee had a higher pre-dismissal share of household income. 
 Table 8 shows the moderating effects of these characteristics on the 2008-2012 average 
treatment effect of antidepressant use, based on Model (3). The table presents the coefficient 
estimates on the triple interactions Characteristic*Post*Treated (Post*Treated and 
Characteristic*Post are also included but the coefficients are not tabulated for the sake of clarity). 
Column (1) shows results from five separate univariate specifications where we interact 
Post*Treated with a single characteristic measured pre-treatment (during 2007 or on 1 January 
2008), while Column (2) presents results from a model where all the five interactions are included. 
Table 8 shows that treatment effects are larger for employees without a partner, who have at least 
one child in their households, and whose salary constitutes a large share of their total household 
income. Treatment effects appear to be larger for employees who are at least 45 years old (we 
adopt this cut-off from Deelen et al., 2018), but the difference is not statistically significant at any 
conventional level, whereas male and female employees appear to be similarly affected. Taken 
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together, these treatment heterogeneity estimates provide evidence that job insecurity is indeed a 
potential factor behind the increase in antidepressant use for employees who did not lose their jobs. 
In summary, our results suggest that the adverse mental health effects of refinancing 
constraints are present both for employees who lose their jobs due to these constraints and for 
employees who manage to keep their jobs albeit possibly suffer from greater job insecurity.  
From the firm’s perspective the mental illness of non-dismissed employees is of particular 
importance as it may negatively affect firm productivity. Therefore, our results illustrate that the 
mental health costs of financial constraints are not restricted to dismissed employees but also affect 
the firm. 
5. Robustness and placebo tests 
There are several assumptions regarding treatment specification and sample selection that 
underpin our results of a greater post-2007 increase of antidepressant use in high-repayment share 
firms. In this section, we present estimates where we relax/alter these assumptions. We also 
perform a placebo test to verify that our results are not driven by the excess sensitivity of treated 
firms to the economic downturn in 2008-2009 (i.e., macroeconomic effects unrelated to the credit 
supply shock). 
First, in Table 9 we present robustness tests based on changes in the sample selection 
criteria.  Column (1) presents the baseline estimate of the 2008-2012 average treatment effect on 
antidepressant use from Table 4. Column (2) excludes firms with any long-term debt resulting 
from intra-group loans on their opening 2007 balance sheet. Ideally, we would restrict our 2008 
repayment share variable to the repayment of long-term debt that is most probably binding and 
hard-to-renegotiate, such as bank loans and bonds. Due to data limitations this is not possible, but 
excluding firms with intercompany loans would alleviate concerns that our repayment share 
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variable picks up non-binding repayment obligations within the group. The point estimate from 
column (2) is very close to the baseline estimate, although the sample size decreases. 
Columns (3) to (5) investigate alterations on the long-term debt to total assets selection 
criterion to capture the degree to which firms rely on long-term debt. When we include firms with 
lower long-term debt to total assets ratios (columns (3) and (4)), the treatment effects become 
smaller, while restricting the sample to firms with at least 15% long-term debt to total assets 
increases the estimate. This is as expected, as the size of the refinancing shock is arguably 
proportional to the share of long-term debt on the balance sheet. 
Column (6) retains all industries (i.e., the state-controlled and heavily regulated industries 
such as utilities are not excluded). Adding firms that belong to regulated industries or form part of 
the state administration yields a slightly lower (0.34 pp vs 0.44 pp) 2008-2012 treatment estimate, 
indicating that for such firms the refinancing problems may be more easily addressed without 
repercussions on the job security of the employees. 
Finally, in columns (7) and (8), we re-estimate the treatment effects after controlling for a 
firm size effect. We exclude the largest 5% and 10% of firms, respectively, where we measure size 
as the number of employees in the sample. Excluding these large firms yields almost identical 
treatment effects, indicating that the results are not driven by a handful of the largest firms. 
[Insert Table 9] 
 Next, we turn to alternative thresholds for the current portion of long-term debt to define 
treated and control firms. Table 10 repeats the analysis of Column 1 of Table 4, and presents the 
estimated treatment effects on antidepressant use when we use a lower (20%) or higher (30%) cut-
off value. The effects for a higher (30%) cut-off, which results in only 10 treated firms, are slightly 
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larger than the baseline estimates. If we choose a lower cut-off value (20%), our estimation results 
are expectedly attenuated due to the fact that the refinancing (di)stress may be somewhat lower.  
[Insert Table 10] 
Finally, we perform a placebo test to verify that our results are not driven by the excess 
sensitivity of the treated firms to the economic downturn in 2008-2009 (i.e., macroeconomic 
effects unrelated to the credit supply shock). We exploit the fact that after a short-lived recovery 
in 2010-2011 the Dutch economy fell back into recession in the second half of 2012 (“double-dip 
recession”). Importantly, Duchi and Elbourne (2016) show that the effect of credit supply shocks 
on corporate lending growth and corporate investments is negligible in this period, noting that 
“when we look at the double-dip recession in 2012, adverse credit supply shocks play no role” (p. 
65). Therefore, the 2012 recession presents a negative economic shock without a strong corporate 
credit supply component: if our results are indeed driven by disruptions in corporate credit supply, 
we would expect to find no positive treatment effects in this period. Indeed, we demonstrate in 
Table 11 that, following the 2012 recession, growth patterns in antidepressant use are similar 
between employees of firms that had to repay a large share (>25%) of their long-term debt in 2012 
and employees of other firms in our sample. If anything, employees of high-repayment firms 
exhibited a slight decrease in antidepressant use. Columns (2) to (3) repeat the job separation 
analyses from Table 6 in this placebo setting. The results reveal that employees of 2012 high-
repayment firms did not suffer from increased job insecurity. In summary, the placebo test shows 
that repayment of a high share of long-term debt has no detrimental effects on employees during 
an economic downturn when credit constraints were not binding. 
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[Insert Table 11] 
6. Conclusion 
This paper argued that corporate financial constraints can have adverse effects on employee 
mental health, and that these effects are not restricted to employees who lose their job due to these 
constraints. To identify the causal effects of financial constraints, we exploited the plausibly 
exogenous variation in firms’ need to refinance their long-term debt in 2008, a period when 
refinancing became more difficult due to a severe tightening of bank lending standards. Using 
administrative data from the Netherlands on the antidepressant medicine use of 330,000 employees 
in 352 firms, we estimated that employees of firms that were facing the repayment of at least 25% 
of their long-term debt in 2008 were 0.44 pp more likely to consume antidepressants in the 2008-
2012 period. This is an economically significant 9% increase relative to the 5% unconditional 
prevalence of antidepressant use, comparable to the 7.51% rise in antidepressant prescription 
volume following the 20% decline in US housing prices between July 2006 and February 2009 
estimated by Lin, Ketcham, Rosenquist and Simon (2013). 
These results are qualitatively robust to alternative industry classifications, variations in 
control variables, restricting or broadening the sample of firms, and to altering the 25% refinancing 
cut-off. A placebo test suggests that the results are not driven by the excess sensitivity of treated 
firms to the economic downturn in 2008-2009 (i.e., macroeconomic effects unrelated to the credit 
supply shock). Furthermore, the results extend to a survey-based measure of mental health: treated 
employees exhibited increased probability of having a high degree of mental health problems in 
2012, as measured by the Kessler psychological distress scale. 
Although the estimated effects can be partially explained by higher job loss in constrained 
firms, most of the increase in antidepressant use occurs at employees who manage to keep their 
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jobs. Studies of employee-level heterogeneity in the treatment effect, among employees who keep 
their jobs, suggest that antidepressant use grew more for employees for whom job insecurity may 
represent a greater mental health burden: employees with children, employees without a partner 
and employees who salary constitutes a greater share of family budget. Although we lack direct 
data on employee perceptions of job security, these results suggest that increased perception of job 
insecurity is a possible transmission channel for deteriorating mental health. 
Given the important role of mental health in employee productivity, these results provide 
evidence that deteriorating mental health represents a hitherto undocumented cost of financial 
constraints for firms. Furthermore, they also illustrate that crisis periods can have an adverse 
mental health effect even on employees who manage to keep their jobs, as these employees may 
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Figure 1: Credit standards of Dutch banks on loans to large enterprises 
 
Notes: Net percentages of banks tightening and easing their credit standards (overall) in the preceding quarter, weighted by loans 
outstanding; Source: ECB (SDW item BLS.Q.NL.ALL.O.E.Z.B3.ST.S.BFNET) 
Figure 2: New loans minus retired bank loans of Dutch non-financial companies (EURm) 
 
Notes: Retired bank loans minus new loans of Dutch non-financial companies (EUR mln), Source: Statistics Netherlands - 























Figure 3: Treatment effects on antidepressant use (percentage points) 
 
Notes: Estimated treatment effects on antidepressant use (percentage points) and 95% confidence interval. The corresponding 

















Table 1: Steps of sample composition 
 # enterprise 
groups 
# business 
units # employees 
Total in 2007 SFLE 1,204   
Excluding foreign-owned firms 609   
Excluding firms with <10% LT debt on total assets 378   
Merging with business units 378 3,018  
Merging with employees 376 2,106 801,297 
Excluding government-controlled and regulated industries 353 1,936 464,447 
Restricting to age 20-60 years 352 1,917 388,539 
Restricting to household head and partner 352 1,914 331,899 
Excluding interns, outsourced employees and director-major shareholders 352 1,899 328,229 




Table 2: Pre-treatment summary statistics 
 Treated   Control Raw Δ Adjusted Δ t-stat 
Panel A: Firm characteristics N mean sd p10 p50 p90  N mean sd p10 p50 p90    
Liquid assets to TA, 2007 23 0.03 0.04 . 0.00 .  329 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.12 -0.02 -0.01 -0.93 
LT debt to TA, 2007 23 0.43 0.19 . 0.43 .  329 0.32 0.19 0.14 0.27 0.59 0.11 0.07 1.55 
Cash flow, 2007 23 0.17 0.13 . 0.14 .  329 0.11 0.09 0.03 0.10 0.20 0.06 0.06 2.12 
Total assets, 2007 (EURm) 23 489 1753 . 82 .  329 663 2457 33 92 1139 -174 51 0.11 
Share of current portion of LT debt 23 0.34 0.09 . 0.30 .  329 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.15 0.28 0.27 13.41 
No. of employees in sample 23 1552 5554 . 242 .  329 889 1920 70 285 1993 663 909 0.74 
Composition of LT debt, end-2006:                 
LT debt to group companies 23 0.00 0.01 . 0.00 .  321 0.03 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -1.68 
Subordinated loans 23 0.04 0.12 . 0.00 .  321 0.09 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.31 -0.05 -0.07 -1.92 
Bonds outstanding 23 0.02 0.10 . 0.00 .  321 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.59 
LT bank loans 23 0.79 0.31 . 0.93 .  321 0.66 0.39 0.00 0.86 1.00 0.13 0.10 1.22 
Other LT debt 23 0.15 0.26 . 0.01 .  321 0.20 0.33 0.00 0.01 0.93 -0.05 -0.04 -0.58 
Industry composition:                 
Wholesale and retail trade 12       88         
Other 11       233         
                 
Panel B: Employee characteristics                 
Antidepressant user, 2007 (%) 35692 4.75 21.26 0.00 0.00 0.00  292537 3.99 19.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.76 0.00 0.01 
Taxable salary, 2007 (EUR) 35174 25177 24308 5181 21772 45540  285135 37576 48808 10073 33926 63280 -12399 -5969 -2.30 
Tenure in years, 2008 35692 9.26 8.80 0.00 7.00 22.00  292537 8.79 8.85 0.00 6.00 21.00 0.47 0.99 1.91 
Age, 2008 35692 39.60 10.85 24.00 40.00 55.00  292537 42.10 9.98 28.00 42.00 56.00 -2.50 1.46 2.50 
Female 35692 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00  292537 0.32 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.18 -0.07 -1.50 
Notes: The table reports pre-treatment descriptive statistics for the treated and control firms, and their employees. The column Raw Δ presents the difference in means. The column Adjusted Δ 
presents the difference in means estimated in a regression where we control for 2-digit SBI 1993 industry fixed effects, and in case of Panel B also for the four financial variables included in our 
main specification (liquid assets to TA, LT debt to TA, cash flow, and log TA). The column t-stat presents the t statistic on the regression coefficient reported in column Adjusted Δ. No 10th and 
90th percentiles are reported for treated firms, following Statistics Netherlands guidelines, because these values would refer to fewer than 10 companies. Variable definitions are presented in Table 
A.2 of Appendix A.
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Table 3: Summary statistics for the outcome variables 
 Period N mean sd p10 p50 p90 
Antidepressant use (%) 2006-2016 3,559,278 5.03 21.86 0 0 0 
Cumulative job separation (%) 2010 328,229 29.78 45.73 0 0 100 
Cumulative UWV dismissal (%) 2010 328,229 0.80 8.93 0 0 0 
Notes: The table presents summary statistics for the key outcome variables of the panel regressions in Table 4 and 
Table 6. Antidepressant use, cumulative UWV dismissal, and cumulative job separation are indicator variables (multiplied 
by 100 to be expressed in %). Antidepressant use takes the value 1 if a person was reimbursed for (any) antidepressant use 
in the given year. Cumulative job separation takes the value 1 if the initial employment relationship (that existed on 1 January 
2008) has ended in the given year or any year before. Cumulative UWV dismissal takes the value 1 if the initial employment 
relationship has ended with an UWV dismissal permit for economic reasons in the given year or any year before. The column 
Period indicates the years of observations for which the reported summary statistics apply. (The 2010 value of the cumulative 
variables reflect changes in the 2008-2010 period.)  
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Table 4: Baseline estimates and variations in control variables 
Dependent variable: 
Antidepressant use (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Panel A: dynamic effects     
2006 0.0849 0.0375 -0.0375 0.116 
 (0.88) (0.47) (-0.42) (1.22) 
2008 0.412*** 0.284*** 0.335*** 0.414*** 
 (3.47) (3.20) (3.21) (3.41) 
2009 0.445*** 0.267** 0.269** 0.460*** 
 (3.41) (2.38) (2.28) (3.69) 
2010 0.493*** 0.278*** 0.330** 0.538*** 
 (2.86) (3.10) (2.46) (3.19) 
2011 0.675*** 0.418*** 0.438*** 0.749*** 
 (3.55) (2.99) (2.86) (4.22) 
2012 0.417** 0.192 0.240 0.497*** 
 (2.31) (1.62) (1.47) (2.95) 
2013 0.298 -0.0726 0.133 0.363* 
 (1.50) (-0.40) (0.76) (1.90) 
2014 0.544** 0.200 0.373 0.637*** 
 (2.18) (1.00) (1.64) (2.60) 
2015 0.415 0.0781 0.331 0.476* 
 (1.42) (0.33) (1.16) (1.68) 
2016 0.364 0.0257 0.283 0.451 
 (1.02) (0.08) (0.81) (1.30)      
Panel B: average effects          
2008-2012 0.437*** 0.273*** 0.343*** 0.468*** 
 (3.12) (3.50) (3.03) (3.61)      
Employee fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 







2007 firm variables * year f.e. Yes No Yes Yes 
2007 employee variables * year f.e. No No No Yes      
# Firms (clusters) 352 352 352 352 
# Observations 3,559,278 3,559,278 3,559,278 3,559,278 
Notes: The table shows estimates of the treatment’s (having to repay at least 25% of long-term debt in 2008) effects 
on employees’ antidepressant use. Antidepressant use is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a person was 
reimbursed for (any) antidepressant use in the given year. Panel A presents the effects over time, it shows the 
coefficient estimates on the interaction term of the treatment dummy and the year dummies in Model (1). The 
omitted year is 2007. Panel B reports the average effect for the 2008-2012 period from Model (2). All specifications 
include employee fixed effects. Column (1) (baseline) controls for (industry * year) fixed effects and year effects 
that depend on 2007 firm characteristics (industry code, liquid assets to TA, LT debt to TA, cash flow, and log TA). 
Column (2) only controls for (industry * year) fixed effects. Column (3) is similar to Column (1) but uses industry 
sections to define the (industry * year) fixed effects. Finally, Column (4) allows year effects to also depend on 2007 
employee characteristics (tenure in years, taxable salary, gender and age). The number of observations refer to 
Panel A. Variable definitions are presented in Table A.2 of Appendix A. The t-statistics, reported in parentheses, 
are based on standard errors clustered at the firm (i.e. enterprise group) level. *, **, and *** denote significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
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Table 5: Treatment effects on a survey-based mental health measure 
 (1) (2) 
   
Dependent variable, 
level of mental problems (2012): High 
At least 
moderate 
   
Treated 0.0249** 0.0511* 
 (2.05) (1.91) 
   
Liquid assets to TA, 2007 0.0485 -0.0923 
 (1.46) (-1.11) 
   
LT debt to TA, 2007 0.00457 0.0984** 
 (0.25) (2.57) 
   
Log total assets, 2007 0.000963 -0.000347 
 (0.68) (-0.08) 
   
Cash flow, 2007 -0.0441 -0.0731 
 (-1.22) (-0.88) 
   
Age, 2008 -0.000526** -0.00143*** 
 (-2.46) (-2.91) 
   
Female 0.0198*** 0.0983*** 
 (3.28) (7.79) 
   
Antidepressant user, 2007 0.119*** 0.342*** 
 (4.83) (13.28) 
   
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Unconditional mean of dependent variable 0.0352 0.326 
# Firms (clusters) 323 323 
# Observations 7,604 7,604 
Notes: The table reports treatment effects on a survey-based mental health measure from the 2012 Health 
Monitor. The measure is based on 10 questions in which respondents are asked how often (1=never to 
5=always) they felt a specific feeling (e.g. sadness, hopelessness) in the last four weeks. The scores for the 
individual questions are summed up to a total score between 10 and 50. The dependent variable “High” 
(level of mental health problems) is an indicator if the score is over 29, and “At least moderate” is an 
indicator if the score is over 15. Both columns estimate a cross-sectional regression controlling for 2007 
firm characteristics, and 2007 employee characteristics, gender, age and antidepressant use. Variable 
definitions are presented in Table A.2 of Appendix A. The t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based 
on standard errors clustered at the enterprise group level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 6: Treatment effects on job separation 






   
2008 0.0460*** 0.00224 
 (2.97) (1.34) 
   
2009 0.0666** 0.00667** 
 (2.29) (2.15) 
   
2010 0.0620** 0.0125** 
 (2.01) (2.42) 
   
Employee fixed effects No No 
Industry * year fixed effects Yes Yes 
2007 firm characteristics * year f.e. Yes Yes 
# Firms (clusters) 352 352 
# Observations 984,687 984,687 
Notes: The table reports treatment effects (coefficient estimates on the treatment indicator) from regression 
models where the dependent variable is cumulative job separation (column 1) or cumulative UWV 
dismissal (column 2). The indicator Cumulative job separation takes that value 1 if an employee’ initial (1 
January 2008) job ended, for any reasons, by the end of the year in consideration.  The indicator Cumulative 
UWV dismissal takes the value 1 if the job ended with an UWV dismissal permit for economic reasons.  
We estimate 6 different regression models (for each of the two dependent variables by year – 2008, 2009, 
2010). Similar to column 1 of Table 4, all regressions include industry * year fixed effects and year fixed 
effects interacted with 2007 firm financial characteristics. As on 1 January 2008 all employees – by 
definition – worked at their initial job, the regressions do not include employee fixed effects. Variable 
definitions are presented in Table A.2 of Appendix A. The t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based 





Table 7: Treatment effect on employees keeping their job (stayers) 
 Dependent variable: 
Antidepressant use (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: dynamic effects     
2006 0.0849 0.0375 -0.0375 0.116 
 (0.88) (0.47) (-0.42) (1.22) 
2008 0.323*** 0.255*** 0.278*** 0.323** 
 (2.60) (2.82) (2.45) (2.57) 
2009 0.326** 0.189* 0.196 0.355** 
 (2.03) (1.65) (1.46) (2.21) 
2010 0.362** 0.238*** 0.267* 0.415** 
 (1.98) (2.59) (1.86) (2.31) 
2011 0.343 0.224 0.261 0.415** 
 (1.63) (1.63) (1.39) (2.01) 
2012 0.407** 0.193 0.224 0.517*** 
 (2.28) (1.50) (1.29) (2.86) 
2013 0.144 -0.179 -0.0323 0.224 
 (0.73) (-1.06) (-0.19) (1.17) 
2014 0.371 0.0690 0.190 0.455* 
 (1.58) (0.42) (0.77) (1.96) 
2015 -0.150 -0.276* -0.155 -0.0776 
 (-0.77) (-1.90) (-0.72) (-0.43) 
Panel B: average effects     
2008-2012 0.303*** 0.204*** 0.266*** 0.330*** 
 (3.20) (2.61) (3.05) (3.45) 
Employee fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry * year fixed effects SBI93 SBI93 Sections SBI93 
2007 firm variables * year f.e. Yes No Yes Yes 
2007 employee variables * year f.e. No No No Yes 
# Firms (clusters) 352 352 352 352 
# Observations 2,282,577 2,282,577 2,282,577 2,234,619 
Notes: The table shows estimates of the treatment’s (having to repay at least 25% of long-term debt in 2008) 
effects on employees’ antidepressant use. Contrary to Table 4, which follows employees over time even if they 
leave their initial job, this table only considers employees who stay in their initial job (the job on 1 January 
2008) for at least the end of the year of the observation. The dependent variable (antidepressant use), the control 
variables, and the four specifications (1) to (4) are as defined in Table 4. Panel A presents the effects over time; 
it shows the coefficient estimates on the interaction term of the treatment dummy and the year dummies in 
Model (1). The omitted year is 2007. Panel B reports the average effect for the 2008-2012 period from Model 
(2). Observations from 2016 are dropped due to the unavailability of data to determine which employees stayed 
in their job till the end of 2016. The t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered 
at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
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Table 8: Treatment heterogeneity among stayers 





   
No partner 0.141 0.430** 
 (1.05) (2.41) 
   
Children>0 0.313*** 0.470*** 
 (2.88) (3.66) 
   
Male 0.082 0.003 
 (0.71) (0.02) 
   
High share in HH income 0.280** 0.379*** 
 (2.51) (3.22) 
   
Older than 44 0.046 0.145 
 (0.42) (1.39) 
   
Industry*year fixed effects Yes Yes 
2007 firm characteristics*year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Employee fixed effects Yes Yes 
Post*Treated, Characteristic(s)*Post Yes Yes 
# Firms (=clusters) 352 352 
# Observations 1,633,679 1,633,679 
Notes: The table reports estimates of treatment heterogeneity for the 2008-2012 average treatment effects, 
based on Model (3). The reported coefficients are for the triple interactions Characteristic*Post*Treated, 
Post*Treated and Characteristic(s)*Post are also included but the coefficients are not presented for the sake 
of clarity. All specifications include the same controls as Column (1) of Table 4. We restrict observations 
to stayers, employees who keep their jobs at least till the end of the year in consideration. Column (1) 
presents results from five separate univariate specifications where we interact Post*Treated with a single 
characteristic measured pre-treatment (during 2007 or on 1 January 2008). Column (2) presents a 
multivariate specification where Post*Treated is interacted with each characteristic. No partner is 1 if a 
person lived without a partner (unmarried or married). Children>0 is 1 if a person had at least one child in 
his/her household. High share in household income is 1 if the share of a person’s salary in his/her total 
household income was in the top half of the distribution (conditional on having or not having a partner). 
Older than 44 refer to the age of a person in 2008. The number of observations in Column (1) refers to the 
maximum number of observations among the five ‘univariate’ interaction tests. The t-statistics, reported in 
parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 9: Variations on sample selection 







LT debt to 
TA >0% 
LT debt to 
TA >=5% 










         
Average treatment effect  
2008-2012 0.437*** 0.385** 0.225** 0.364*** 0.492** 0.338*** 0.432*** 0.419** 
 (3.12) (2.54) (2.48) (3.14) (2.52) (4.07) (2.76) (2.37) 
         
Employee fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry * year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2007 firm variables * year f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Treated firms 23 22 41 31 20 25 22 21 
# Control firms 352 304 485 408 301 375 335 317 
# Observations 2,282,057 1,279,136 3,092,926 2,622,039 1,944,757 3,210,309 1,205,793 855,764 
Notes: The table reports 2008-2012 average treatment effects (from Model 2) when the sample selection criteria are changed. All specifications include the same controls as Column 
(1) of Table 4. Column (1) shows the baseline (repeats column (1) in panel B of Table 4). Column (2) excludes firms that had any long-term group lending on their 2007 opening balance 
sheet. Columns (3) to (5) vary the minimum long-term debt to total assets ratio (excluding the current portion). Column (6) also includes firms from government-controlled and highly-
regulated industries. Columns (7) and (8) exclude the top 5% and 10% largest firms (based on the number of employees in our sample), respectively. The t-statistics, reported in 
parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered at the firm (i.e. enterprise group) level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 10: Alternative treatment classifications 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 25% (baseline) 20% 30% 
Panel A: dynamic effects    
    
2006 0.0849 0.133 0.0459 
 (0.88) (1.32) (0.38) 
    
2008 0.412*** 0.291** 0.362*** 
 (3.47) (2.04) (3.34) 
    
2009 0.445*** 0.269* 0.395** 
 (3.41) (1.66) (2.56) 
    
2010 0.493*** 0.347* 0.560** 
 (2.86) (1.92) (2.55) 
    
2011 0.675*** 0.502*** 0.695*** 
 (3.55) (2.67) (2.75) 
    
2012 0.417** 0.287 0.490** 
 (2.31) (1.48) (1.99) 
    
2013 0.298 0.169 0.194 
 (1.50) (0.83) (0.76) 
    
2014 0.544** 0.468** 0.442 
 (2.18) (2.04) (1.52) 
    
2015 0.415 0.329 0.232 
 (1.42) (1.23) (0.73) 
    
2016 0.364 0.304 0.0185 
 (1.02) (1.00) (0.05) 
    
Panel B: average effects    
2008-2012 0.437*** 0.268* 0.465** 
 (3.12) (1.80) (2.49) 
    
Employee fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry * year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
2007 firm variables * year f.e. Yes Yes Yes 
# Treated firms 23 37 10 
# Control firms 329 315 342 
# Observations 3,559,278 3,559,278 3,559,278 
Notes: The table presents alternative treatment specifications, variations on the 2008 repayment threshold of 
long-term debt. All specifications include the same controls as Column (1) of Table 4. Column (1) presents the 
baseline (repeats Column (1) of Table 4), where we classify firms as treated if they had to repay at least 25% 
of their long-term debt in 2008 (based on the 2007 balance sheet). In column (2) we lower this repayment share 
to 20%. In column (3) we increase it to 30%. The changing number of treated and control firms is presented at 
the bottom of the table. The t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered at the 
firm (i.e., enterprise group) level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 11: Placebo test – firms with high 2012 debt repayment share 








    
    
2010 -0.125   
 (-1.35)   
    
2012 -0.107 -0.0146 0.00397 
 (-1.30) (-0.43) (1.42) 
    
2013 -0.252** 0.000868 0.00245 
 (-2.38) (0.03) (0.42) 
    
2014 -0.188 -0.0193 0.000785 
 (-1.34) (-0.54) (0.11) 
    
2015 -0.355** -0.0361 -0.000807 
 (-2.58) (-0.96) (-0.11) 
    
2016 -0.284   
 (-1.43)   
 
   
Employee fixed effects Yes No No 
Industry * year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
2011 firm variables * year f.e. Yes Yes Yes 
# Firms (clusters) 406 406 406 
# Observations 2485867 1433912 1433912 
Notes: The table presents the results of a placebo test where we define financially constrained (treated) 
firms as those that had to repay at least 25% of their long-term debt in 2012. Similar to Panel A of Table 4, 
column (1) of this table also presents the coefficient estimates on the (treatment dummy * year) interaction 
terms. The omitted (baseline) category is 2011. Antidepressant use is defined as in Table 4; Cumulative job 
separation, Cumulative UWV dismissal are defined as in Table 6 (cumulative job separation and cumulative 
UWV dismissal is only defined from 2012 on, as all employees are by definition with their firm on 1 January 
2012). Controls are similar to those in column (1) of Table 4 but are defined using 2011 data. The t-statistics, 
reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered at the firm (i.e., enterprise group) level. *, 




Table A.1: Statistic Netherlands datasets used 
Name in English  SN name Description 
Annual Statistics of Finances of Large 
Enterprises, SFLE 
Statistiek Financiën van Grote 
Ondernemingen, SGFO 
Annual survey on the finances (balance sheet, income statement) of the largest non-financial 
enterprises in the Netherlands. As of 2007, all enterprises are sampled with total assets over EUR 23 
million. Close to 100% response rate for the largest 300 enterprises. 
General Business Register, GBR Algemeen Bedrijven Register, ABR Continuously updated database of companies registered in the Netherlands, with information on 
corporate/legal structure (enterprise group, business units, legal entities), industry classification 
codes and events (e.g. mergers, liquidation). 
Qualitative characteristics of 
employment relationships 
BAANKENMERKENBUS Information on, inter alia, start and end date of employment relationship, type of employment (e.g. 
regular employee, on-call, outsourcing, manager-large shareholder), social security insurance 
indicators (e.g. insured for unemployment benefits). 
Quantitative characteristics of 
employment relationships 
BAANSOMMENTAB Information on, inter alia, taxable salary, calendar days worked and payroll tax withheld. 
Annual dispensations of medicines per 
ATC-4 code per person 
MEDICIJNTAB All medicines dispensed that are reimbursed under the basic health insurance policy to persons who 
are registered in the Municipal Personal Records Database (GBA). No quantities are recorded; 
merely the 4-digit ATC codes (e.g. N06A) are listed that were dispensed for a given person in the 
statistical year. 
2012 Health Monitor Gezondheidsmonitor Volwassenen en 
Ouderen 2012, GEMON 2012 
The Health Monitor provides information on the physical and mental health, and physical activities 
of the Dutch population 19 years and older. It is a combination of data from SN’s annual Health 
Survey (Gezondheidsenquête) and data from the quadrennial Adult Monitor (VGZ, 
Volwassenenmonitor) and the Elderly Monitor (GZO, Ouderenmonitor) of all 28 GGDs (Municipal 
and Regional Health Services). 
Extract from the Municipal Personal 
Records Database 
Gemeentelijke Basis Administratie, 
GBAPERSOONTAB 
Demographic background data (that do not or hardly change) of all persons who appear in the 
Municipal Personal Records Database from 1 January 1995 (e.g. gender, year of birth, migration 
background). 
Income of People IPI Annual income components (such as labor income, subsidies, income from entrepreneurship) of 
people resident in the Netherlands on the 1st of January of the statistical year. Information on the 
position of the person within the household with respect to the head of the household. 
Wealth and household composition VEHTAB / 
KOPPELTABELVEHTAB 
Annual wealth components (assets and liabilities) of households in the Netherlands on the 1st of 




Name in English  SN name Description 
National Labor Conditions Survey Nationale Enquête 
Arbeidsomstandigheden, NEA 
Annual survey of workers (excluding self-employed) between 15 and 74 years old on working 
conditions, work content, labor relations and employment conditions.  
Job terminations with a dismissal 
permit from the UWV 
Beëindigde banen via een 
ontslagvergunning van het UWV, 
UWVONTSLAGTAB 
Information about people for whom dismissal has been requested from the Employee Insurance 
Agency (EIA, in Dutch UWV), whether or not granted, where the employment relationship has been 
broken in the statistical year. The datafile contains person identifiers, the reason of the dismissal 
permit request (culpable behavior, economic reasons or long-term sickness) and the date when the 





Table A.2: Variable descriptions 












Long-term debt to group companies Both in the Netherlands and abroad, maturity>1 year SFGO /B65 
Subordinated loans Maturity>1 year SFGO /B67 
Bonds outstanding Maturity>1 year SFGO /B69 
LT bank loans  Loans from domestic financial institutions, including mortgages, maturity>1 year SFGO /B71 
Other long-term debt Other unclassified long-term debt, including loans from private parties, financial leasing, derivatives, 
member loans (for cooperatives) 
SFGO /B73 
Current portion of long-term debt Repayment obligation of long-term debt (including bonds and other debt) due within one year SFGO /B85 
Total long-term debt = Long-term debt to group companies + Subordinated loans + Bonds outstanding + Loans from domestic 
financial institutions + Other long-term debt 
 
Total long-term debt including its 
current portion 
= Current portion of long-term debt + Total long-term debt  











(Log of) total assets  SFGO/B37 
Liquid assets to total assets ratio Liquid assets are the sum of Cash and cash equivalents, Term deposits with financial institutions, and 
Receivables from financial institutions (current account). The ratio is defined as (Liquid assets)/(Total 
assets) 
SFGO/B31-B35; SFGO /B37 
Long-term debt to total assets = Total long-term debt / Total assets  
Cash flow = (Net income + depreciation and amortization) / Total assets SFGO/R20, R05 
SBI93 - 1993 version of the Dutch 
industry classification codes 
The industry classification codes are registered at the Chamber of Commerce for each legal unit (e.g. B.V.). 
In the GBR, SN provides a code at the business unit level by using the code of the legal unit within the 
business unit that has the most employees. Similar to this approach, we use the code of the business unit 
with the most employees within an enterprise group as the enterprise group level code. 













Initial job The job (employment relationship) that existed on 1 January 2008 and based on which the employee was 
selected into the sample (employees with multiple jobs on 1 January 2008 are excluded) 
 
Taxable salary Gross salary over which payroll taxes and national insurance contributions (e.g. AOW old-age pension) are 
calculated; only from the initial job 
BAANSOMMENTAB / FISCLOON 
Tenure in years Integer part of number of days since the employment relationship exists (on 1 January 2008) divided by 365 
(e.g. tenure in days = 400, tenure in years = 1). 
BAANKENMERKENBUS / 
DATUMAANVANGBAANID 
Age in 2008 = 2008 – year of birth GBAPERSOONTAB / 
GBAGEBOORTEJAAR 
Female  GBAPERSOONTAB / GBAGESLACHT 
Has a partner Takes the value 1 if person i is recorded as household head with (married or unmarried) partner, or as partner 
of the household head in the 2007 Income of Households dataset; otherwise takes 0. 
IPI / POSHHK 
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Antidepressant use indicator Takes the value 1 if person i is listed as an antidepressant (ATC4 code: N06A) user in year t. Takes the value 
0 if person i is not registered as antidepressant user and person i is in the supplementary table 
(KOPPELTABELVEHTAB) of the Wealth of Households (VEHTAB) dataset, which contains all residents 
on 1 January. The variable is set to missing otherwise. 
MEDICIJNTAB, 
KOPPELTABELVEHTAB 
Cumulative job separation Takes the value 1 if the initial job of person i terminated by the end of the given year. A job is considered 
terminated in year t if there is no salary received from the job in year t+1 (more precisely if the job identifier 
baanid cannot be matched to year t+1’s BAANSOMMENTAB datafile); otherwise equal to 0. 
BAANSOMMENTAB / BAANID 
Cumulative UWV dismissal Takes the value 1 if the initial job of person i terminated by the end of the given year and a dismissal permit 
was requested from the Employee Insurance Agency (EIA or, in Dutch, UWV) to terminate the job for 
“economic reasons”; otherwise equal to 0. (In other words, it takes the value 1 if the job identifier baanid 




Degree of mental health problems Measure based on ten questions of the Kessler Psychological Distress Scale (K10) (Kessler et al., 2003), [in 
the past four weeks, how often did you feel …] (1) tired out for no good reason, (2) nervous, (3) so nervous 
that nothing could calm you down, (4) hopeless, (5) restless or fidgety, (6) so restless you could not sit still, 
(7) depressed, (8) that everything was an effort, (9) so sad that nothing could cheer you up, and (10) 
worthless. For each question respondents can choose between the options 5 ‘Always', 4 'Usually', 3 
'Sometimes', 2 'Occasionally' and 1 'Never’. The scores for the ten questions are summed leading to a total 
score between 10 and 50. The Health Monitor classifies people with a total score between 16 and 29 as 
suffering from a moderate degree, and with a total score over 29 as suffering from a high degree of 
psychological complaints. 
GEMON 2012 / GGADA201 
Notes: This table reports the description of all the variables used in the analysis. The Annual Statistics of Finances of Large Enterprises (SFLE) contains both opening and closing balance sheet values; in 
the main analysis we use 2007 closing values, therefore we refer to these variables in the table below. “Initial job” refers to the employment relationship that existed on 1 January 2008, the date on which 





Table B.1: Worrying about job loss and antidepressant use 
Dependent variable:  
antidepressant use (%) (1) (2) 
   
Concerned about keeping job 2.190*** 1.843*** 
 (9.36) (7.88) 
   
Female  2.375*** 
  (11.99) 
   
Age  0.519*** 
  (8.30) 
   
Age squared  -0.00447*** 
  (-5.89) 
   
Has partner  -2.354*** 
  (-9.25) 
   
Tenure in years  -0.0492*** 
  (-4.15) 
   
Constant 4.118*** -8.332*** 
 (41.52) (-6.86) 
   
2-digit SBI 93 industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Unconditional mean antidepressant use (%) 4.53 4.53 
# Firms (clusters) 21436 21436 
# Observations 61575 61575 
Notes: The table presents the relation between antidepressant use and the indicator “Concerned 
about keeping job” that is based on the question “Are you concerned about keeping your job? 
(yes/no)” from the National Labour Conditions Survey (NLCS). Antidepressant use is defined as 
in Table 4. In both specifications a pooled cross-sectional regression is estimated with data from 
2007 to 2010. Column (1) only controls for industry fixed effects, whereas column (2) further 
controls for gender, age, age squared, an indicator if the person lived with a (married or unmarried) 
partner, and the length of the person’s current employment relationship (on the 1st of January of the 
year). The t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered at the firm (i.e. 
















    
Treated -0.00585 -0.00891 0.00374 
 (-0.23) (-0.36) (0.14) 
    
Liquid assets to TA, 2007 -0.0668 -0.0497 -0.0463 
 (-1.42) (-0.75) (-0.51) 
    
LT debt to TA, 2007 0.0432 0.0964** 0.151** 
 (1.43) (2.24) (2.11) 
    
Log total assets, 2007 -0.000283 -0.00690** -0.0112** 
 (-0.11) (-2.37) (-2.56) 
    
CF, 2007 0.0578 0.101 0.0812 
 (0.90) (1.16) (0.73) 
    
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Unconditional mean of outcome 0.133 0.232 0.325 
# Enterprise groups (clusters) 325 325 325 
# Observations 275714 275714 275714 
Notes: This table presents estimates of differential job separation rates between firms defined as Treated in our 
baseline specification (23 firms that had to repay at least 25% of their long-term debt in 2008) and firms defined 
as Control, controlling for 2-digit SBI93 industry fixed effects and financial variables measured year-end 2007. 
The sample includes 1 January 2005 employees of the Treated and Control firms who meet the same sample 
selection criteria as for Table 4 (on-call or regular job, between 20 and 60 years old, household head or partner 
of household head). The dependent variable (job separation) is defined as in Table 6. The t-statistics, reported 
in parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered at the firm (i.e. enterprise group) level. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively 
